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HEALTH LAW 
Can International Patent Law Help Mitigate Cancer Inequity in 
LMICs? 
Srividya Ragavan, SJD and Amaka Vanni, PhD 
 
Abstract 
Although low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) bear 75% 
of the cancer burden globally, their available resources to treat 
cancer constitute less than 5% of global health resources. This 
inequity makes it imperative to take appropriate measures to 
treat and prevent cancer in LMICs, which should include 
consideration of trade and patent policies. This article 
highlights some impediments to effective use of existing 
policies to promote access to treatment and prevention 
measures in LMICs and offers recommendations about next 
steps. 
 
Introduction 
Cancer incidence is rising globally, resulting in financial, physical, and 
emotional distress to families and burdening public health services. According 
to the World Health Organization (WHO), the global cancer burden was 
estimated to have risen from 14.1 million new cases in 2012 to 18.1 million 
new cases in 2018 and from 8.2 million deaths in 2012 to 9.6 million deaths 
in 2018.1 Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) bear 75% of cancer 
deaths.2 Asia and Africa, for example, have a higher proportion of cancer 
deaths (7.3% and 57.3%, respectively) compared to their incidence (5.8% and 
48.4%, respectively) than other countries due, in part, to enormous inequities 
in cancer treatment.3 Indeed, the available resources to treat cancer in LMICs 
compose less than 5% of the global share of resources for cancer control.4 
Correspondingly, only 10% of children diagnosed with cancer in LMICs are 
cured compared with more than 80% of such children in high-income 
countries.4 A WHO finding that less than 30% of low-income countries report 
having treatment services available compared to more than 90% of high-
income countries underscores the enormous inequities in cancer treatment 
and access to cancer medications.5 These disparities make it critical to focus 
cancer control efforts on LMICs.  
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In these countries, many new cancer medications are exorbitantly expensive 
relative to individual income. For example, one company’s egregious original 
price tag of Rs 280 428 per month (about $5000 at that time) for sorafenib 
tosylate, a drug for treating primary kidney cancer and advanced liver cancer, 
was nearly 5 times higher than the median annual income in India.6 Like this 
drug, many cancer drugs are unaffordable for large number of patients 
diagnosed with cancer in poorer nations. 
 
Efforts to effectively improve access to medicines by reducing costs of cancer  
medications should look to international trade agreements and, particularly, 
TRIPS flexibilities for compulsory license (explained below), which can (and 
should) be used to address health burdens, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Just as in the case of an epidemic, efforts to address cancer should be mindful 
of the labor and economic loss that ensue when productive individuals are 
lost to disease. In order to be involved effectively in such efforts, the medical 
community must appreciate how international trade and patent prescriptions 
intersect with efforts to improve access to cancer medication, especially in 
LMICs where such access remains inadequate. The focus of this essay, 
therefore, is on how international patent law can help mitigate the cancer 
burden in LMICs. 
 
Global Trade Policies and Cancer 
The inclusion of intellectual property (hereafter, IP) within the global trade 
framework7 was a defining moment for global access to medication. In broad 
terms, IP rights are legal tools designed to result in public benefit by 
promoting private rights. Thus, IP rights recognize innovations by awarding 
monopoly rights to the creator as a means to incentivize creativity. In 1995, 
when the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS agreement),8 which forms a part of the larger World Trade 
Organization (WTO),9 became effective, it required all member states to 
provide a 20-year term of protection for all pharmaceutical innovations. The 
TRIPS agreement provided limited flexibilities for countries to weigh IP rights 
against public health and developmental needs.8 Specifically, Article 31 of the 
TRIPS agreement allows for compulsory license, a mechanism that permits a 
third party to produce a patented product or process without the consent of 
the patent owner. The patent owner still retains the right to the patent and 
receives royalties for the products made under the compulsory licence. 
However, this provision allows a sovereign government to authorize the 
licensing of a patent to produce a generic version of the drug, enabling greater 
access to it during a public health crisis. 
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Nevertheless, the inadequacies of the compulsory license during global public 
health crises—particularly the HIV/AIDS crisis—forced member states to 
adopt, in 2001, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health. The Doha Declaration affirms the right of member states to 
implement policies to enable access to medicines to address a national public 
health crisis.10 Thus, Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement in conjunction with the 
Doha Declaration reaffirms the rights of sovereign nations to “protect public 
health and enhance access to medicines.”11 Importantly, while the Doha 
Declaration reaffirmed member countries’ ability to compulsorily license a 
patent for the production of generic drugs to address a public health crisis, it 
underscored the existence of member countries that are unable to take 
advantage of the compulsory license because they lack the manufacturing 
capabilities to even produce generic medications. Hence, the WTO General 
Council, in 2005, adopted Article 31(bis),12 which allows for export of generic 
drugs from member countries that can produce licensed medication to 
member countries that lack manufacturing facilities but need the medication. 
Through this provision, the TRIPS agreement allows nations to act either 
individually or as a regional group in granting compulsory licenses to export 
pharmaceutical products to member countries with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities. However, the definition of what constitutes a 
national public health crisis has remained contentious.13 
 
To date, there has been limited use of compulsory licenses for cancer drugs. In 
fact, only 2 countries have issued compulsory licenses for cancer treatment to 
reduce the cost of medication. India’s first (and so far only) compulsory license 
was for sorafenib, a drug to treat kidney cancer,14 and Thailand granted 
compulsory licenses over 3 cancer medications: erlotinib (for small cell lung 
cancer), letrozole (for early breast cancer) and docetaxel (for breast cancer).15 
Both countries cited the high cost of the patented drugs as the reason for 
issuing compulsory licenses to improve access to these medicines in their 
patient population.16 
 
Despite their limited use, compulsory licenses in these countries were hugely 
contentious.17 Specifically, both countries were unilaterally targeted by the 
United States through the Special 301 process, which identifies nations 
whose domestic IP laws and policies are perceived as creating market access 
barriers to US business interests. As a result, India and Thailand have featured 
in the Priority Watch Lists compiled annually by the Office of the US Trade 
Representative under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 for having 
instituted legitimate health safeguards.18 Unilateral US actions have been on 
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shaky legal grounds because the trade regime only provides for multilateral 
dispute settlement. That the United States, as a rule, unilaterally forces trade 
concessions from countries using negotiated flexibilities to alleviate a public 
health crisis has resulted in interventions by the WHO and the United 
Nations19 in favor of countries that lack the same bargaining power as the 
United States. Nevertheless, US actions have made countries hesitant to use 
compulsory licenses to increase access by lowering the cost of cancer 
medications.20 
 
Notwithstanding the TRIPS agreement’s provision for compulsory licenses, 
other impediments from patent policies have stymied efforts to provide 
access to medication. Some examples of pharmaceutical patent-related 
impediments include evergreening21 and the cost and use of public funds to 
create private property.22 Additionally, barriers to competition from follow-on 
products during the postpatent period include provisions for data and market 
exclusivity for clinical trial data and provisions that act as a barrier to national 
interventions.23 The following section discusses 2 issues that most affect 
access to cancer medications: data and market exclusivity provisions that 
affect national interventions (eg, preventive measures). 
 
Patents and Cancer Prevention 
One of the important policy barriers to addressing cancer inequities concerns 
provisions for data exclusivity. Data exclusivity protects clinical trial data for a 
given period of time. Typically, the clinical trial data submitted by the 
innovator drug company is protected by separate data and market exclusivity 
periods that run parallel with the patent protection term.24 During the term 
when data exclusivity prevails, competing generic drug companies cannot rely 
on clinical trial data to get approval for follow-on products. Thus, the data 
cannot be submitted to gain approval for a generic drug from the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). During the term of market exclusivity, the FDA 
accepts applications but does not grant market approval for a generic 
manufacturer’s drug, thus ensuring additional monopoly protections for the 
drug. Thus, data and market exclusivities work as an additional layer of 
protection over patents. 
 
For manufacturers of innovator pharmaceuticals, protection of clinical trial 
data provides an additional economic opportunity in that it creates a new 
market for the clinical trial data. In the United States, a biologics drug that is 
important for treating cancer or autoimmune diseases, for example, can 
benefit from 20 years of patent protection and an additional 4 years of data 
exclusivity and 8 years of market exclusivity, resulting in a guarantee of a total 
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of 12 years of market exclusivity,25,26 and the FDA grants new chemical 
entities a total data exclusivity period of up to 5 years.27 The European Union 
currently allows 8 years of data exclusivity for the originator’s preclinical and 
clinical test data.28 Pharmaceutical companies have slowly increased the 
period of data exclusivity, however. In the United States, in addition to data 
and market exclusivity, there is paediatric exclusivity that runs for 6 months 
and an orphan drug exclusivity that runs for 7 years.29 In fact, the United 
States had sought to extend exclusivity for data in its bilateral and regional 
agreements. For example, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, 
sought a 10-year data exclusivity for new biologics, which would have 
represented an increase in the term of exclusivity for Mexico and Canada,30 
although the final text approved on December 13, 2019, does not include the 
10-year exclusivity requirement.”31 
 
Importantly, extended data exclusivity periods may effectively provide market 
exclusivity for compounds that fail patent scrutiny and thus help maintain 
high pharmaceutical prices because even when a patent is declared invalid, 
access to data is unavailable for generics. So, if Company A has a drug whose 
active ingredient is found unpatentable, the drug falls into the public domain 
and hence should be available to the generic drug manufacturer. 
Nevertheless, on account of data exclusivity laws, the generic drug company 
will be prevented from using the clinical trial data to have its drug approved. 
Indirectly, this restriction results in awarding Company A market exclusivity 
even though it does not have any innovation in the market. Thus, with 
expensive medications such as cancer drugs, data exclusivity delays the entry 
of generic drugs into the market until the data protection period is over, and it 
indirectly allows the innovator pharmaceutical company to monopolize the 
market for even off-patent materials. 
 
Conflict Between Global Trade and Cancer 
A recent dispute under the WTO’s dispute settlement process involving 
several nations highlights the intersection between patents and trademarks 
as well as the importance of domestic interventions to efficiently preserve 
public health. In the Australia plain packaging case,32 several countries 
disputed Australia’s plain packaging laws. The law required that tobacco 
products not use logos, brand name, imagery, or promotional text on their 
packaging. The objective was to standardize the appearance of the packets to 
reduce the appeal of tobacco products and thereby prevent health 
consequences from smoking. The law is part of Australia’s national 
comprehensive strategy to improve public health by reducing the use of, and 
exposure to, tobacco products. The complaining countries claimed that the 
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plain packaging requirements restricted trade and violated key aspects of the 
TRIPS agreement—particularly, the companies’ ability to protect and 
promote their trademarks. The complaint was that, in restricting the use of 
trademarks to preserve public health, Australia interfered with the IPs of the 
complainants. The WTO panel found that plain packaging requirements can 
and do make a meaningful contribution to Australia’s objective of curbing 
tobacco use and exposure in order to prevent cancer despite its violation of 
trademark rights.32 The panel reiterated the importance of taking preventive 
measures to protect humans and prevent public health risks, given the 
extensive evidence of smoking as a key contributor to lung cancer.32 
 
The Australian law provides a useful model for other countries interested in 
instituting such preventive measures. In fact, in 2016, the United Kingdom 
(UK) statutorily imposed plain packaging for tobacco products. The law came 
into force when the Supreme Court of the UK refused to consider an appeal by 
the tobacco industry against the law.33 This case sheds light on how LMICs 
could align domestic public health objectives with emerging multilateral public 
health policies in the area of cancer prevention as well as cancer treatment. 
 
Conclusion 
The past decade’s trade and patent policies have largely turned access to 
medication in LMICs into a luxury. Effective interventions for cancer treatment 
and prevention are thus needed in LMICs to reduce both human and financial 
costs of the cancer burden. Such interventions necessitate strategic 
policymaking and the inclusion of TRIPS flexibilities in proposed national 
legislation to enable the legislation’s passage and efficient implementation. 
Although the inclusion of flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement has led to 
increased access to cancer medications, data and market exclusivity 
continues to pose impediments to access. It is therefore imperative that 
policies to prevent and treat cancer employ many-pronged approaches, which 
should involve both the medical and the trade community. Importantly, the 
medical community’s interest in treating and preventing cancer should inform 
the global trade agenda. As interventions employed to tackle HIV/AIDS have 
shown, concerted and coordinated policy interventions can lead to desired 
results. The same should hold true for cancer. The bottom line is that the 
increased global incidence of cancer cries out for improved access to 
medications for cancer prevention and treatment. 
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